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Source: IHRLI Report
IHRLI Observation On Shelling Frequency Onto Sarajevo:
It has been observed that the besieging forces have on many occasions increased shell fire in reaction to statements made by local political leaders. It has also been observed that the besieging forces seem to calculate events and the risks that they can take in relation to threats by third-party Governments and organizations. In this regard, when threats by third-party Governments or organizations are not perceived as immediate, the besieging forces increase or continue their shelling of the city.
For example, Sarajevo was hit with a siege-high 3,777 shells on 22 July 1993 after the United States ruled out direct intervention to prevent the shelling of the city. The opposite behaviour was observed in August 1993, when President Clinton warned that the United States would consider bombing Serbian forces if the shelling of Sarajevo continued. When this threat appeared immediate, the attacks on Sarajevo diminished and Serbian troops were withdrawn from the surrounding mountains to the southwest. Likewise in reaction to the ultimatum by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 9 February 1994, which gave Bosnian Serb forces 10 days to withdraw their heavy weapons or face heavy airstrikes, the besieging forces substantially complied and curtailed their shelling of the city. This behaviour suggests that there is a centralized command and control of the besieging forces and that when there is pressure for the shelling to stop, it does.