Source: Yugoslavia.com. Slobodan Milosevic interviewed by BBC's Laura Silber (Sept. 25, 1995)
Complete text of the interview given by president of Serbia
Slobodan Milosevic to Laura Silber, BBC
Broadcast on 25 September 1995
In 1987, we faced in the first place the problem of Serbia's
special position in Yugoslavia. In contrast to the other
republics, which had a clearly defined position in
Yugoslavia, thanks to the 1974 Constitution, Serbia was
simply handicapped, split up into three parts, because under
that Constitution, the both provinces had some powers which
were causing conflicts in Serbia, while Serbia proper was not
defined at all, in the constitutional and political sense
alike.
In simple terms, the entire economic system and social life
were institutionally in a certain state of confrontation.
In addition, as you know, a separatist avalanche had been
triggered off again in Kosovo already in the eighties.
Although I will not say that it resulted from shared feelings
of all Albanians in Kosovo, it certainly did result from a
persistent activity of the Albanian separatist movement. I
always dissociate the Albanians from the separatist movement,
which as you probably remember, had defined its goal in
Kosovo in the eighties, in public at that: an ethnically
clean Kosovo. The position of this province and the fact that
it had almost all powers of a state were misused then, so
that almost 40,000 Serbs were driven away from Kosovo. Rapes
were committed, people were killed, even graveyards were dug
up, and monasteries, orchards and crop fields were set on
fire. The Serb exodus from Kosovo began.
In a way, the political position of Kosovo as a province in
which the Albanians had majority voting rights in
decision-making, caused a big crisis. Many of them were
separatists whose objective was to separate Kosovo from
Serbia, proclaim Kosovo a republic and have it annexed to the
neighbouring Albania subsequently. In view of that, we took
action with a view to uniting Serbia and making its status
equal to that of the other Yugoslav republics. In other
words, the objective was to provide Serbia with the same
powers as those vested in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, so that it wouldn't
act in its three different functions - Serbia itself and its
two provinces, and would be able to pursue its own policies,
as all of the other Yugoslav republics were doing.
One of the obstructions to that was also such a very
long-lived bureaucratic leadership of Serbia, which was also
an obstruction to the development of a modern market economy,
and there was also the inherited, demagogic attitude to the
Albanian separatist structures. We were simply faced with
that problem and we had to see to the reunification of
Serbia, in addition to taking a big step towards
debureacratizing and democratizing the political life. That
was when sessions were open to public for the first time,
live broadcasts began to be made and the press began to be
briefed fully on the moves made. Thus, the entire public
opinion was mobilized towards changing everything that we all
thought was not good.
QUESTION: What can you remember about the developments on
that day in April 1987, when you stood up in front of people
and said: "Nobody may beat you up"?
Well, I remember actually that what you have just said. The
situation there was simply intolerable. People were deprived
of their rights completely. We never thought that somebody
could be discriminated in this country. And it was absurd
that Serbs were discriminated in Serbia, because that
province was given such powers as are normally vested in
states, because such powers were misused by just a few
Albanian separatists who happened to be at key political
positions. We simply had to end that agony of the people
living in Kosovo, and I mean the both people, not only the
Serbs, since a strained atmosphere and confrontation suit no
one. As you can see, there are have been no tensions in
Kosovo in the last few years, there are no murders in Kosovo
and the crime rate there has not gone above the average for
the whole country. What is most important and often
forgotten, when we adopted in 1990, that is to say in 1989,
the new Constitution of Serbia, under which Serbia was united
and when state powers of the provinces were at long last
returned to Serbia, when Serbia became equal to the other
Yugoslav republics, everything was done completely legally
with due observance of the procedure for amending the
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. That procedure was a
very stiff one and it made it necessary also for the
assemblies of autonomous provinces to vote for amendments to
the Constitution. In such political atmosphere which was
created from 1987 to 1989, also the Assembly of the
Autonomous Province of Kosovo,in which, I must tell you that,
the Albanians held the majority of seats, also voted for
amendments and the new Constitution of Serbia. They too
understood that constitutional changes are necessary and that
a single Constitution of Serbia is essential. That was done
in March 1989 in a very democratic way, using political means
exclusively. Later on, when the Yugoslav crisis broke out,
certain tendencies of the separatist movement in Kosovo were
revived. However, it must be borne in mind that changes to
the constitutional structure of Serbia were carried out in a
completely lawful and constitutional manner, in full
observance of the constitutional procedure.
QUESTION: Let's get back to 1990, when you were faced with
the culmination in Slovenia. What were the items of your
dispute in the course of the 14th Party Congress?
Well, the Slovenian leadership simply felt that it would be
better for Slovenia to get out of Yugoslavia, to secede. That
is how the Yugoslav crisis began. The Slovenes were the ones
who opened the door to the Yugoslav crisis, although I
wouldn't say that they are responsible for all of that, since
on the one hand, as far as internal factors are concerned,
the crisis was caused by a growing wave of nationalism. As a
multi-ethnic country, Yugoslavia undoubtedly couldn't have
any benefit from that growing wave of nationalism. On the
other hand, a great external pressure was exerted by the
countries interested in seeing Yugoslavia disintegrate and in
expanding their sphere of control and interests also to some
parts of the former Yugoslavia. These forces found their
fifth column in Yugoslavia, in these nationalist circles.
Slovenia, the nearest and westernmost Yugoslav republic, or
its leadership to be more exact, began to toy with the idea
of their being better off if they were to get out of
Yugoslavia. When the crisis broke it, we took one position
and we still have it. We felt that it would be best for all
Yugoslav peoples to stay together and look after Yugoslavia,
although we also felt that we are not the ones who have the
right to decide on behalf of the Slovenian or Croatian or any
other people. We have preserved that positive attitude to
Yugoslavia even to date, believing that all people have the
right to self-determination. It would be better for them to
stay in Yugoslavia, but if they want to and think that it
would be better for them to secede, then that it is their
inalienable right which cannot be challenged by anybody. That
was our position from the very beginning.
However, it so happened that those people in Slovenia, and
I'd say even more so those in Croatia subsequently, felt that
their secession would not be convincing enough without
bloodshed, if it is not carried out violently. Namely, when
the crisis broke out, we kept saying, I kept saying in public
and at the meetings we had with the leaderships of the other
republics, that we are not challenging anybody's right to
self-determination, but let us then change the Yugoslav
constitution, let us put all people on equal footing, let us
make it possible for all peoples to exercise the right to
self-determination in the same way, so that each people can
do what they deem best. We believe that it would be better
for Yugoslavia to remain integrated, like it used to be -
multi-ethnic. However, we don't want to take such powers into
our hands, it is a matter to be decided on by all people
concerned.
As for the war in Slovenia, we didn't even know that it had
broken out; it was some kind of an agreement between the then
federal prime minister Ante Markovic and the military
leadership. Actually, even today, I don't know how much this
was connected with some ideas of the Slovenian leadership and
how much of it was done off somebody's own bat. Be it as it
may, we condemned it immediately. We didn't want a part of
Yugoslavia to be militarily confronted with Slovenia in any
way. Anyway, I think that they had only two killed in that
war. You will be able to establish this better by listing the
data relating to the developments in the early nineties,
since that wasn't a war. I'd say that it was a trivial
incident provoked by our then federal government.
At that time, we were even accused of contributing to the
disintegration of Yugoslavia by tolerating the behaviour of
the Slovenes. We felt that they have the right to determine
their own fate and we still feel so. That's how it happened.
QUESTION: Could you tell us something about the 14th Party
Congress, about your conflict with Mr.Kucan and how things
went?
Well, I don't know whether it would be worthwhile to go into
details, since the Slovenes, or their party leadership to be
more precise, simply wanted to impose some visions and
solutions affecting the future Yugoslavia, which would bring
the provisions of the 1974 Constitution to absurdity, I'd
say. The roots were formed by the 1974 Constitution and they
destroyed Yugoslavia's economy directly. The 1974
Constitution provided that each republic is responsible for
its own economy as a whole. It meant the breaking up of the
Yugoslav economic system. At the time the whole world was
undergoing integration, we were disintegrating. Practically
each republic had its own economic programme and began to
develop itself autarchically, resorting to political demagogy
in relation to its own general public, to the effect that it
is doing so in order upgrade the special interests of the
people and republic concerned. As if special interests of
that people and that republic can be upgraded more if we are
all divided, instead of setting up our total economy better
by joint forces in a bigger market. Therefore, that evolution
from 1974 reached in 1990 the point of absurdity in some of
their ideas, to the effect that we must separate completely,
which had nothing to do either with market economy or common
sense, since we took integration as something necessary, and
disintegration, fragmentation, atomization into our
individual republics as a feudal approach to modern economy,
which can yield negative results only.
Therefore, we clashed over a principled issue. Our concept
was geared to a single Yugoslav market and greater
integration with Europe. I think that even today it would be
quite illogical to think that one of the Yugoslav republics
would get better integrated in the European economic trends
if it gets disintigrated in the Balkans and in Yugoslavia
beforehand. In principle, that is where the roots of the
conflicts and differences we had at that time were. I can't
interpret to you what was said and what actually happened
then. However, it's all on tape and if you are interested,
you can see and hear for yourself.
QUESTION: And now, let's get to Lord Carrington's peace plan.
Our broadcast is showing to the West for the first time that
you were very much interested in seeing this agreement
signed. What made you decide not to accept that plan in its
final version?
I'll tell you. What was proposed as The Hague document could
not have been acceptable, because by a stroke of the pen,
they simply abolished Yugoslavia by that Hague document. They
had no right to do that. They abandoned the principles which
we altogether had accepted at the beginning of The Hague
Conference. It was a question of just a few principles and I
wouldn't like to waste your time on that. You can see that
for yourself. However, the Conference accepted that, counting
on the possibility of a political solution being found
beforehand, formulating the people's right to
self-determination, the political agreements on the mode in
which such right is to be exercised. A final political
agreement was reached as to the future of the then
Yugoslavia, and everything we should all agree on beforehand
should then be sanctioned and made official or be
officialized fully.
However, a few weeks after the Conference had made a start
with such principles, the European Community simply abandoned
them. The so-called Badinter Commission was set up. It was
not a body of jurists; it was only nominally a body of
jurists that took decisions and made appraisals on the basis
of political pressures. They proclaimed that Yugoslavia no
longer exists, while we were of the opinion that Yugoslavia
does exist and that they can't abolish Yugoslavia by a stroke
of the pen. The question of who was to remain in Yugoslavia
was no business of the Badinter Commission or of The Hague
Conference; it was up to the Yugoslav peoples to decide on
that. Namely, it stands to reason that if we are not
challenging any people's right to withdraw from Yugoslavia,
then it would not be possible to challenge the right of other
people who want to stay in their existing country,
Yugoslavia, to do so. I don't see why we were being or could
be forced into deciding not to exist any longer, just because
somebody wants to leave the country. We wanted to stay in
Yugoslavia.
It was absurd that in view of such developments, we here were
subsequently accused of being nationalists. It turned out
that those who had seceded from Yugoslavia forcibly with a
view to establishing their national or putting it better,
nationalist states, were given support by the international
community and treated like democrats, while we, who were
striving for the preservation of the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia
and who have preserved the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia and
remained to live in the country we lived in before, were
accused of being nationalists. These two things can in no way
go together. That is so obvious. There are simply no
documents which could bring into question facts and
everything that has happened. What did happen was that those
who had seceded from Yugoslavia forcibly were rewarded, while
those who had decided to stay in Yugoslavia and preserve it,
were punished.
QUESTION: Let's get back to April 1993. Lord Owen wrote that
you said that you have accepted his plan. Why did you accept
it?
I'll tell you quite briefly, without details. What is
involved is a principled approach. We had the same position
from the outbreak of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and we still have it. I think that time will show that there
is no other solution. The crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina
can be settled only politically, not with military means.
That's one thing.
Number two: a political solution to the crisis in Bosnia and
Herzegovina can be a successful one only if equal protection
of the interests of the three peoples living in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Muslims, Serbs and Croats.
I am sure that a vast majority of your public doesn't know
whether Bosnia and Herzegovina was defined prior to the
crisis as a republic of three constituent nations - Muslims,
Serbs and Croats - or whether it is defined as such in its
own constitution now. Therefore, their conflict could not
have been interpreted as it was: as Serbia's aggression
against Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was a conflict inside
Bosnia and Herzegovina between its three constituent nations.
At the illegal referendum for the secession of Bosnia and
Herzegovina - I say illegal because if three nations and
their consensus are laid down in the Constitution, such a
crucial decision may not be taken without the consent of one
of the constituent nations - the Serbs refused to become
second-rate citizens of a Muslim republic set up by the
Sarajevo regime, and they said: We want to stay in
Yugoslavia. That problem could have been settled politically.
I think that the international community was in a fair way to
resolving that problem. A special conference on Bosnia was
formed, and it was chaired by Ambassador Cutiliero of
Portugal. I the conference in The Hague well; it was chaired
by Carrington, and Cutiliero took the floor first and
presented his report. You are bound to have that on tape, so
that you can check it. His main opinion was that the
conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieved a certain
positive evolution. Izetbegovic took the floor next and
strongly insisted on Bosnia and Herzegovina being recognized
internationally. I stepped in after them by posing a simple
question: Cutiliero is referring to a positive evolution
concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Izetbegovic is
insisting on instant international recognition of the
illegally established Bosnia and Herzegovina, resulting also
in a crisis of the conference chaired by Cutiliero. These two
matters are in a collision. Why spoil the positive evolution
of the Lisbon Conference by resorting to a premature
recognition? A premature recognition could produce tragic
consequences.
That did happen: several weeks later, the international
community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the
referendum according to which it had declared its
independence was an illegal one. In addition, at the moment
of its recognition, it had no collective presidency but a
rump one; it had no assembly since it had disintegrated, the
parliament had disintegrated; and it had no government since
it, too, had disintegrated, because all of the constituent
nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina have always been
represented in it. Moreover, the then recognized government
didn't control at that time even a half of the territory of
Bosnia & Herzegovina.
Thus, all rules applicable to such cases were simply ignored
and a premature recognition was given, which was used by the
Sarajevo Government towards recruiting international support
to its right to establish order by military means in the
country in which that government was recognized. That
Government was never elected in that country for the
performance of such task.
Therefore, all democratic principles were violated and the
Sarajevo Government headed by Alija Izetbegovic was provided
with an excuse for launching military operations against and
exerting pressure on the Serbs. So the war broke out. I found
out subsequently that Lord Carrington himself said that was
the biggest mistake - the premature recognition of Slovenia,
followed by Croatia and lastly, the absurd Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which had never existed as a state.
I will now get back to your question. Precisely because we
believed from the very beginning of this conflict and crisis
that there can be no other solution than the one that will
protect all of the three nations equally. When the Vance-Owen
plan was proposed, it had a more or less balanced approach.
Our position was that it is essential for the interests of
the Muslims, Serbs and Croats to be protected equally in
Bosnia. We would give our support to any plan which protects
such interests equally. Unfortunately, it was rejected, the
war continued and many people got killed in the meantime.
QUESTION: How did you try to persuade Karadcic into accepting
it?
Well, my attempt was made in public, since the session of the
Assembly at Pale, which I attended, was broadcast live. I
used precisely some of the arguments I have already mentioned
to you. The most important thing was to stop the war
instantly and then, under the circumstances of diminished
tension and temperature, absence of bloodshed and clashes,
try to find reasonable political solutions which would
protect equally the interests of the both or of the all three
parties. Even now the most important thing would be to stop
the war, not to specify the details of all possible
solutions, because details can be discussed endlessly. The
arguments we used were recorded, and we spent a whole day and
night in a heated debate. I think that they didn't realize
the advantages of the Vance-Owen plan because they were too
obsessed with territorial issues. These issues never will be
nor are the most important ones. Borders will probably
disappear in Europe gradually. Europe will not be divided by
Chinese walls in the 21st century. People will mix. Isolation
will not be the future of the Balkans or Europe. It was more
important to achieve some other values, particularly equal
treatment, equal status and impossibility of anybody being
discriminated. These were also the reasons for giving support
to our people outside Yugoslavia, outside Serbia, and that is
the limit of our support - that people are protected,
accorded equal rights, free and non-discriminated. As for the
kind of constitutional arrangement, in the circumstances of
equality, one nation will share its lot with the others. In
that respect, we never made special demands for our people
concerning rights, or demands that other nations in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia may have.
QUESTION: (The introducer said: Laura Silber began the second
half of the interview by asking President Miloûevic a
question about problems in the Serbian province of Kosovo).
It was a comprehensive policy of isolating Kosovo from the
rest of Yugoslavia and a consistent implementation of the
concept of the Albanian separatist movement which had
announced its goal officially. It was then that I heard for
the first that expression - ethnically clean - because until
then, reference was made to Kosovo only. Their objective was
an ethnically clean Kosovo. We felt that this goal was an
uncivilized one in the first place, and a very dangerous one.
It's nonsensical to speak about ethnically clean countries at
the end of this century. I don't know whether an ethnically
clean country exists anywhere. Their thus set goal involving
ethnic cleanliness of Kosovo implies discrimination of all
non-Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo. The grounds on which they
wanted to pursue that goal were the powers vested in that
Province, giving it practically the status of a republic and
all levers of power necessary for the achievement of such a
goal, which I'd say is a purely Nazi one.
Therefore, we were faced with an anti-civilizational matter
at the end of the 20th century and a policy of brutal
discrimination, in which it is resorted to the cruelest
means, including everything from murder and rape to driving
people away from their homes and setting houses, churches,
orchards and crop fields on fire, all in an effort to create
the so-called "Kosovo Republic", which is absurd in Serbia,
because Kosovo is not just an ordinary part of Serbia. Kosovo
is the very heart of Serbia, the whole history of Serbia is
in Kosovo, all of our monasteries are in Kosovo, and Kosovo
has been Serbian for so many centuries now. It is incredible
for any Serb that somebody should even mention the
possibility of Kosovo being taken away, stolen from Serbia
and turned into a part of some other state. However, I must
tell you that not only Serbs were the victims of such
Albanian separatism, since its victims were also the
Albanians who didn't want to take part in that dirty
activity, as well as members of the other nations, such a
Montenegrins, Turks, Muslims, Gypsies and others living in
Kosovo, including some Croats who lived there. The Albanian
separatist movement simply announced its goal in public:
ethnic cleanliness of Kosovo, which then produced all of the
other, less important, second-rate, third-rate or fifth-rate
manifestations, which as a whole made up a policy of violence
and discrimination, which absolutely had to be stopped, which
we did.
QUESTION: Can you describe to us the moment when the Slovenes
left the hall in that dramatic night of the 14th Party
Congress?
Ah, they didn't leave the hall all of a sudden. They had
prepared themselves for leaving it. That was a game, a quite
dirty and transparent one. They had even checked out of their
hotel that morning. The practical-minded Slovenes didn't want
to pay for another night, so they checked out in the morning
and left their luggage at the reception. Therefore, they
feigned anger, dissatisfaction and protest, and then left the
hall. They left their hotel rooms at 7 a.m. and paid their
bills, and at noon they feigned their resignation,
disappointment, anger at the non-acceptance of their
arguments, etc.
As for political implications, I drew attention at that
Congress to what is going to happen because of such a
destructive behaviour, not only because of their destructive
behaviour, but also because of the Congress' tolerant
attitude to such behaviour. Many Croatian delegates didn't
give them support, while no Bosnian delegates gave them
support.
However, because of what I'd call a compromising, demagogic
state of relations in the then party leadership, the policy
of avoiding grudges, the weakness and I'd say an agony of
helplessness, which was the chief characteristic of the then
political life, it was not possible to formulate a
comprehensive policy geared to the preservation of Yugoslavia
and the preservation of its political unity. The Slovenes
managed to break through that line then and trigger off hell
and chaos in parts of the former Yugoslavia.
QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the hostage crisis
in 1995?
Well, there is no need for that. I mean, I can't tell you any
more than I have already said.
QUESTION: But you nevertheless managed to have them released.
How did you do that?
We did it with great difficulty and huge effort. We felt that
we had to do it, simply because that act meant the staining
of the Serbian peoples' honour. The Serbs never committed in
the past such immoral acts such as tying to lamp posts like
dogs the people who came in good faith, with our consent and
who are not on any warring side. We here were in a situation
in which we could not just condemn that act. Sweden can
condemn, France can condemn or you can condemn, but Serbia
must do more than that. That is why we did everything
possible towards these people being released and returned,
believing that what has happened was absolutely unacceptable
from the aspect of morality in the first place. It wasn't an
easy task, but I can't tell you the details about it.
QUESTION: What do you think about the arrival of the UN
troops in Bosnia and do you now think that they have achieved
their objective?
I wouldn't say that they have been unsuccessful. If you were
to ask yourself whether their activity has contributed to the
achievement of peace, the answer would be no, because it
didn't. However, the answer would be yes to a different
question: Would have the war escalated and been incomparably
more brutal, with many more victims, had the UN forces not
been present? Therefore, the presence of the United Nations
was not useless. It has made it possible for the war to have
a low profile and it is providing better chances for a
peaceable settlement being made, without an escalation which
could absolutely no longer be bridled.
That is why I think that on the whole, the presence of the
United Nations was a useful one. That is also why I think
that the United Nations forces should not be withdrawn from
Bosnia, although I certainly think that neither should they
have dual standards in relation to the parties involved.
The main issue concerning the international community was
that it should accord equal treatment to parties to the
conflict. I can understand your public opinion for always
standing up for the Muslims, because they have lost the war,
since the public opinion always stands up for the weaker
side. However, the war was imposed onto the Serbs in Bosnia,
the Serbs didn't start the war there and the creation of the
impression that Serbia has committed aggression against
Bosnia and Herzegovina is nonsensical. Namely, your general
public failed to understand the fact that the presence of
Serbs in Bosnia does not mean that an army from Serbia has
invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina with a view to occupying it:
the Serbs involved are the citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, who even under the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina make up one of its three constituent nations and
who have refused to be second-rate citizens in a Muslim state
Alija Izetbegovic wanted to create with his followers, with
the support of various external factors.
Therefore, getting back to the role of the United Nations, I
think that it was a positive one on the whole, although I
think that this opinion would have been even better, had the
United Nations not applied dual standards in the approach to
the warring sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the United
Nations Organization manages to secure equal treatment for
all parties to the conflict, its role would be irreplaceable.
If it gives privileges to one side and punishes the other,
its role is likely to fade and turn into its opposite. The
main request is for the United Nations to be unbiased and
objective, otherwise it would be only discrediting itself.
QUESTION: Do you think that one of the causes of the fall of
Srebrenica was precisely the fact that UNPROFOR was defending
one side from the other?
Oh, no. It's quite a different matter. I think that many
mistakes were made there. The agreement on the Srebrenica
safe area was made in 1993. I remember that well. That
UN-protected area was supposed to be demilitarized. General
Morillon told me here in my office that he personally thinks
that the commanding officer in Srebrenica, Oric, had
personally cut the throats of more than 40 Serbs, that he is
a war criminal and that these and other matters will
certainly have to be considered after the war. However, he
then insisted that the status of Srebrenica as a safe area be
accepted, in which case the United Nations would undertake to
demilitarize it. Unfortunately, that did not happen. The
Serbian side accepted it then, and we put in a lot of effort
towards the United Nations request for making Srebrenica a
safe area being accepted. However, according to the reliable
reports and information available to us, by continuously
launching minor and major attacks from this area, Oric's
forces certainly killed more than 100 and seriously wounded
more than 200 people in the neighbourhood. A few days ago,
they burned down two Serbian villages, Viûnjica and Banja
Lucica, and killed all villagers found when they intruded
from Srebrenica.
Under such circumstances, when the United Nations forces were
simply not seeing to the safe area status being observed by
the two parties, a situation arose in which it absolutely
wasn't possible to except that all that could be kept under
some reasonable control. I personally don't know what went on
there, I didn't even know anything about that offensive,
although I realized that a big change was made there,
undoubtedly brought about by such a status, meaning a status
unsettled for two whole years. This offensive, which has been
under way for a few months now and which was launched around
Sarajevo first and then in the enclaves, is happening because
the Muslim leadership felt that they now have a chance of
scoring some military victory and making people lose their
lives towards nonsensical and unachievable goals.
I say again that there is no military solution to the problem
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. None of its constituent peoples,
Serbs, Muslims and Croats, have anywhere to go outside Bosnia
and Herzegovina. They are no outside occupiers, so that you
are liberating your own country. The Serbs are staying where
they are, so are the Muslims and Croats, too. The only
formula is the political one, which will protect the
interests of the Muslims, Serbs and Croats equally, so that
they can carry on living one beside the other. Of course,
when peace is established at last, I'm sure that such peace
and normal life which will follow, will annul many results of
this war, which was a very dirty one. And it is a good thing
that will be so.
QUESTION: We have now reached the last few questions. Can you
tell us something about the rally of February 1989? A million
people were gathered in front of the parliament then, you
were attending a crisis session about the special measures in
Kosovo, and you addressed the people.
I remember the big rally. Yes, it was a big rally. A big
support was being given in Serbia to our effort to settle the
Kosovo issue, to settle the crisis and let people begin to
live normally and on equal footing. I can tell you that even
today, I feel that a vast majority of the citizens of Serbia
think that in a country like Yugoslavia, the present FR of
Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslavia, no other policy than
the policy of ethnic equality can be pursued. Such
multi-ethnic countries can be successful and prosperous only
if they are pursuing a policy of ethnic equality.
A medieval coup was carried out in Kosovo with that slogan
about ethnic cleanliness, pressures and all of the cruel
measures applied. That simply had to be eliminated and all
citizens were for it, including a vast majority of Albanians.
I'm sure of that. Regardless of the accusations we can read
about in the various foreign newspapers, they are in a much
better position, they know that they are living in peace and
security, that they are completely safe and that they can
work normally. Now we can see that Trepca - a lead and zinc
mining and producing complex I intend to see in any case -
has begun to operate again. Of course, it would have begun to
operate earlier had these sanctions not been introduced. It
has begun to operate and many Albanians are going back to
their jobs. They too are no longer paying any heed to their
leadership, the top of their separatist movement, who are
forbidding them to work in any enterprise together with
Serbs. They are coming back, several hundred have already
returned in a week, thousands of people are returning to
their jobs. In simple terms, their policy which was
implemented by the separatist movement in Kosovo has failed.
It hasn't failed only in Serbia as a whole, but it has failed
also in that part of Serbia which is called Kosovo and it has
failed among Albanians. It has failed in Serbia a long time
ago.
QUESTION: We have some marvelous pictures from that rally.
Can you tell us what it was like that night?
Well, it was actually an atmosphere of support to a political
settlement of the Kosovo crisis. That was the essence. There
was nothing else involved.
QUESTION: When do you think you were closest to peace?
I think that peace was closest when we did everything towards
the European Union's proposal being accepted. You will
remember that we met in Geneva or Brussels, I no longer
remember exactly where it was; twelve European ministers and
all parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
representatives of Yugoslavia and Croatia, sat at the same
table. The twelve ministers proposed then to parties to the
conflict and all of us a plan consisting of several items
which I can still remember: that 33.3 percent of the
territory is set aside for the Muslim republic, since this
federation was still not created then, that UN administration
be provided for Sarajevo, and that an outlet to the River
Sava be provided in Brcko. The other two parties immediately
said that the proposals are good, and the Serbian one showed
reserve. We spent days and nights in debating that matter
together, and in the end, it was decided for the EU plan to
be accepted without any reservations. There were many ideas
about its being accepted with this or that reservation, but
our view was that the complete request of the European Union
should be accepted without any reservation, in the interest
of peace. If the twelve European ministers had given a great
deal of thought to that plan and taken that decision, and if
that could be a way towards peace, regardless of whether all
in the leaderships, including that of the Serb Republic,
considered it best or not, it should be accepted. And they
did accept it. We went back to Geneva for the purpose of the
plan being signed. Izetbegovic refused. The European Union
acted thereafter as if it actually hadn't proposed anything.
Peace initiatives simply fail whenever equal treatment is not
accorded to all parties to the conflict, when one side is
taken. There is no chance of success then and we are back to
square one. There can be no grounds for a lasting peace until
a formula providing for equal protection of the interests of
all three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina is arrived at.
Peace at the expense of one nation is not possible. A serious
lasting peace is not possible. What is possible is a half-way
and unstable peace. However, only a peace protecting the
Serbs, Croats and Muslims equally can be a lasting peace, and
we need a lasting peace. That's the main point for the
international community, I'd say. Once it decides to accord
equal treatment to all parties to the conflict, it will have
opened the doors to peace in the Balkans. Peace will have
been achieved.