HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH![]() Publications THE UNINDICTED Reaping the Rewards of EthnicCleansing January 1997, Vol. 9, No. 1 (D) SUMMARY | RECOMMENDATIONS | TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY The same warlords who took control of the town of Prijedor, in northwestern Bosnia andHercegovina, through systematic policies of ethnic cleansingincluding pre-meditatedslaughter, concentration camps, mass rape, and the takeover of businesses, government offices,and all communal propertyhave retained total control over key economic, infrastructure,and humanitarian sectors of the community in the post-war period. The architects ofethnic cleansing, many of whom are under investigation by the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, interact daily with representatives of internationalorganizations. This contact grants them a wholly undeserved legitimacy, given that theyachieved their positions by disappearing the duly elected mayor of the town,Muhamed Cehajic, and thousands of other Bosniak or Bosnian Croat community leaders andcitizens. While international attention has rightly focused on the atrocities committed during andafter the takeover of the town, little attention has been given to the fact that the mayor, deputymayor, police chief, hospital director and director of the local Red Cross got awaywith their crimes and became rich men in the process, having expropriated businesses, homes,and other assets of the non-Serbs of the community, estimated to be worth several billionGerman marks. In Prijedor, as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, the international communitys failureto detain war criminals or to control ongoing abuses by unindicted war criminals has combinedwith the donation of aid to enrich and empower many of the very people most responsible forgenocide and ethnic cleansing. As we have recently also done in Doboj andTeslic, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki has conducted field research in Prijedor to uncover who iscontinuing the cycle of human rights abuses and intimidation and why these criminals remain atlarge and in positions of power. The detrimental impact that Bosnias war criminalscontinue to have on respect for human rights and on long-term prospects for peace is abundantlyclear. It is essential to the peace process in Bosnia and Hercegovina that the internationalcommunity strategically utilize the economic and political leverage at its disposal to facilitate thesuccessful implementation of the civilian components of the Dayton agreement, most importantof which is to hold war criminals accountable and to bring an end to ongoing abuses againstvulnerable populations in the region. The Bosnian administrative district of Prijedor, located west of the city of Banja Luka in what isnow Republika Srpska, was before 1992 a multi-ethnic area with a non-Serb population of wellover 50,000. After the Bosnian Serbs took control of the region in April 1992, the communitiesand homes of non-Serbs were destroyed, families were separated, and thousands of people wereincarcerated in concentration camps, where many were tortured and executed. Tens of thousandswere forcibly deported under inhumane conditions. Today, only about 600 Bosniaks remain. The town also has a small Bosnian Croat community, left without a parish priest since theabduction and disappearance of Roman Catholic priest Father TomislavMatanovic in September 1995. According to the Roman Catholic charity Caritas, there areapproximately 2,674 Bosnian Croats remaining in the Prijedor municipality (1,405 in the town ofPrijedor, 592 in Ljubija, 416 in Ravska, and 261 in Surkovac), out of more than 6,000 BosnianCroats registered in the 1991 census. The Catholic church and all mosques in Prijedor weredestroyed in 1992. Prior to the war, more than half a million non-Serbs lived in what is now thenorthern region of Republika Srpska. Today, fewer than 20,000 non-Serbs remain throughoutthe territory. The criminal administration established in the town of Prijedor achieved their goal of eliminatingnon-Serbs from the society, through planned murder, disappearance, andexpulsion of non-Serb officials, such as mayor Cehajic, and civilians. According to survivorreports, mayor Cehajic and six other men were removed by Bosnian Serb guards from Omarskacamp on July 26, 1992, and have never been seen again. Many of the men responsible for these crimes were members of the Krizni Stab SrpskeOpstine Prijedor, or Crisis Committee of the Serbian Municipality ofPrijedor, established to conduct the usurpation. The police, as will be shown in thisreport, also played a major part in the takeover and in subsequent abuses, both independently andas members of special units sent to round up community leaders or conduct ethniccleansing operations. The police authorities and officers charged today with protectingthe public good in Prijedor, are in many cases the same individuals who have been accused bynumerous witnesses of participation in war crimes. As is true for many towns in the RepublikaSrpska today, the power structure in Prijedor mirrors that which existed during the war. These same local Prijedor authorities have consistently refused to protect non-Serbs or toinvestigate crimes against them, even following the signing of the Dayton agreement. Civilianand police authorities work in tandem to prevent the return of refugees and displaced persons byorganizing or inciting violence against those who attempt to return, and by orchestrating (withthe assistance of the Bosnian Serb Army, according to NATO) the destruction of houses (seesection Destruction of Property to Prevent Repatriation). Restrictions on freedomof movement, the destruction of property, and the ethnically-based eviction of persons throughthe application of discriminatory laws are further evidence that the Bosnian Serb authoritieshave maintained their goal of an ethnically pure entity (or as the Republika Srpska authorities putit, state)the goal that led to massive ethnic cleansingcampaigns during the war. Most recently, according to a reliable local source, the Prijedorauthorities have reportedly destroyed property ownership records, which, if true, would make itnearly impossible for refugees and displaced persons who fled under immediate threat to proveownership of their property. To make matters worse, according to information gathered by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, theinternational community is investing large sums of money in Prijedor throughcommunity projects, many of which were funded by the British government reliefagency, the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) and implemented by IFOR/SFOR. Theillicitly installed local authorities control virtually all economic sectors in Prijedor, includinginfrastructure, public construction and other companies, the media, health care, education, andhumanitarian aid. In at least some cases, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki has learned that personsbelieved responsible for flagrant abuses of the Geneva Conventions and international humanrights law, and in some cases participants in organized crime, have benefited from reconstructionand humanitarian assistance. Due to the current power structure in Prijedor, humanitarian aidand reconstruction assistance is easily misused. Our research leads us to the conclusion that post-Dayton obstructionism by the Prijedorleadership is not only motivated by economic gain but represents a highly organized effort,directed to a significant extent by the Republika Srpska authorities in Pale (especially by theMinistry of the Interior), to prevent permanently the repatriation of non-Serb refugees anddisplaced persons to the Republika Srpska and to retain control over all municipalfunctions. In addition, local Prijedor officials have consistently refused to cooperate with the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and their cooperation with the InternationalPolice Task Force (IPTF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) andother international organizations charged with implementing the civilian aspects of the Daytonagreements has been minimal. This non-cooperation is in direct violation of their commitmentunder the Dayton agreement. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki believes that the failure of theRepublika Srpska authorities to cooperate with certain aspects of the Dayton agreement is theresult of an overall policy. Human Rights Watch/Helsinkis recent report on themunicipalities of Doboj and Teslic, for example, reveals similar patterns to the policies carriedout in Prijedor. Events in the Zone of Separation near Zvornik, the destruction of housing inBrcko, and the expulsion and harassment of minorities in Banja Luka seem to bear this out. According to the U.N. Commission of Experts, The Bosnian Serb implementation ofpractically identical strategies and tactics for the conquest of territories and subsequent detentionof non-Serb pop[ulation]s suggest an overall plan devised prior to the conflict and carried outlocally. According to a November 29, 1996 report by Laura Kay Rozen of the U.S. newspaper TheChristian Science Monitor, of the seventy-four people indicted for war crimes in Bosnia,approximately twenty are in the Prijedor area. In November 1996, four persons indicted for warcrimes were discovered to be police officers in the Prijedor area. Two other indicted persons arereportedly serving in the reserve police, and a third as a member of the specialpolice. Their commander, Simo Drljaca, who by his own admission wasresponsible, along with others, for the administration of concentration camps in the Prijedor area,and who is expected to be indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in the near future, continued toserve as police chief of Prijedor until IPTF demanded his removal from office in September1996 following an armed altercation with soldiers of the International Implementation Force(IFOR). As of January 1997, however, Drljaca has continued to act as chief of police, givingorders directly to Ranko Mijic, his supposed replacement. Control by the Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS), or Serbian Democratic Party, expresses itselfin abuses of the rights of anyone not pledging loyalty to the SDS agenda and methods. Theongoing removal of non-SDS members from businesses, threats against private business ownersby the local mafia, and the control of the media by hard-line SDS representatives, indicate thatmembers of opposition groups and moderates are very limited in their ability to affect thesituation and are, in fact, under threat themselves. Despite all the above, some international actors in Prijedor often fail to criticize the municipalauthorities. An international monitor, for example, when asked in June 1996 about hisinteractions with Drljaca, told our investigators: Drljaca knows he can trust us. [We] arecompletely neutral...it is not our mandate to judge...we never take any side...we never saywhos right and whos wrong...we are here to work for [our organization]...and wehave fine relations with them all. The Importance of Conditionality for Reconstruction Aid The international community has squandered much of the leverage available to enforcecompliance with the Dayton peace agreement, especially by lifting sanctions against RepublikaSrpska. Therefore, the strategic use of reconstruction aid in ensuring compliance has become allthe more important. The international community has an obligation to reassure donors, including U.S. and Europeantaxpayers, that reconstruction aid is used wisely, and that those who used ethnic nationalism asan excuse to murder, imprison and expel compatriots, to steal the property of others and tocontrol humanitarian assistance do not continue to reap the benefits of their criminal activities. Otherwise, aid intended by donors to benefit the ordinary people of Bosnia who have suffereddue to the war will reward their very persecutors or those who have exploited the war situationfor personal gain. For this reason, reconstruction aid should be denied to municipalities wherethe authorities are under investigation for war crimes by the ICTY, or where there has beenserious and/or protracted non-compliance with the Dayton agreement, including involvement bythe authorities in human rights abuses, incitement to violence against returnees, violation ofelection rules and regulations, failure to cooperate with the ICTY (e.g. when indicted persons areknown to reside in a particular town and are not arrested by the authorities and turned over to theICTY for trial), and/or non-cooperation with the IPTF or other international organizationscharged with assisting in the implementation of the Dayton agreement. Under these guidelines, Prijedor would be ineligible for international reconstruction aid untilthere was a change in leadership. The guidelines would not restrict humanitarian assistance,although such assistance should be carefully monitored. An international source who spentmonths in Prijedor told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki in January 1997: Only about 30percent of humanitarian aid [to Prijedor] reaches the people. In towns where there is general compliance with the Dayton agreement, Human RightsWatch/Helsinki recommends targeted reconstruction aid which will assist ordinary peopledirectly, e.g. micro enterprise projects, support of the independent media, support for ethnicallyneutral educational programs, assistance to medical facilities which have demonstrated equity inthe provision of treatment to all citizens, and bypassing publicly owned companies whenpossible. Strict guidelines should be established regarding equal access for all citizens asbeneficiaries of these projects. The World Bank, nongovernmental organizations, and government donors are advised toinvestigate carefully the ownership and history of companies applying for aid and to monitorclosely spending. Donors should keep in mind the possibility that the legitimate owners ordirectors of companies may have been murdered or forcibly removed by local authorities, whoassumed control as the result of an organized strategy, as was the case in Prijedor in 1992. In amore recent example, as the Office of the High Representative reported in November, the SPRS,a Republika Srpska opposition party, alleged that, in 1996 alone, 112 of its members had beenremoved from their jobs because of their political affiliation. According to aNovember-December 1996 report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE),local courts have ruled in many cases in favor of reinstatement, but in none of the cases have thejudgements been enforced. On January 2, 1997, Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic, in a letter to Secretary-General,Kofi Annan, informed him that the indictments of the ICTY were no longer valid and said thatthe arrest of Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic would threaten the existing peaceand rekindle massive civil and political unrest. She continued, Thepresent position of the Republika Srpska is that we are unwilling to hand over Dr. Karadzic andGeneral Mladic for trial in the Hague as we believe that any such trial now falls outside of thescope of the tribunals constitutional framework. In a thinly veiled threat to theinternational community, Plavsic stated, We believe that massive civil and military unrestwould result in the Republika Srpska which might well prove uncontrollable by the civilauthorities. The chances of fighting restarting would, in our judgement, be high. These wouldbe even higher were any attempt made to hunt down Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic andforcibly bring them to trial. (See Plavsic letter attached as Appendix B.) In response to Plavsics letter, the European Commission stated that it would not considergiving aid to Republika Srpska (with the exception of inter-entity cooperation projects andhumanitarian aid) until the Republika Srpska complied with its obligations to the ICTY. TheOffice of the High Representative (OHR), however, has sent mixed messages. In a statement tothe London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Carl Bildt said, I do not acceptthat as an answer, and she knows that. I think that was a stupid letter. In direct talks with theleadership of the Republika Srpska, I made it very clear what we expect to happen, and whatmight be the consequences if that does not happen. Republika Srpska has an interest incooperating with the tribunal, and they are cooperating with the tribunal better than theydid...with the exception of handing over those that are indicted. Which is the fundamentalexception. But that will not be tolerated for long, and they know that. Bildtsspokesman, however, seemed to send a different message, when he stated on January 10 thatPlavsics letter to Annan would not cause any disruption in aid going to the RepublikaSrpska. It makes no difference as I would see it on the flow of reconstruction aid beingdiscussed in Brussels at the moment, said spokesman Colum Murphy, who argued thatPlavsics assertions were legal arguments which she was entitled to make and did notconstitute more than that, despite the apparent threat of violence. This response is mostdisappointing, particularly as it suggests to the Republika Srpska authorities that there will be nofinancial consequences for the outright defiance of binding agreements. Many argue that economic aid should be used as a carrot rather than a stick. The infusion of aidmoney does not guarantee peace or respect for the rule of law, however. Huge expenditures ofcapital (over 260 million DM, or about US165 million) in the city of Mostar was invested to noavail between 1994 and 1996. The assistance did not serve to reunite the city or to preventongoing ethnically based harassment, evictions and expulsions. As has been shown in Mostar, inPrijedor, and in other towns, so long as those responsible for war crimes or involved in organizedcrime are allowed to retain control over resources, ordinary people, especially those who are nowin the minority or who do not support the dominant parties, cannot expect to fully benefit fromthose resources. More than a year has passed since the signing of the Dayton agreement, yet the vast majority ofpersons indicted for war crimes remain at large. There is increasing outrage about the failure toapprehend, detain and try these individuals. At a conference in Dayton, Ohio last November,OSCE Amb. Robert Frowick remarked, The whole peace process rests on this issue. There will not be a better moment than right now, to apprehend the indicted persons. Action must be taken to ensure their apprehension; there must also be more focus on those whohave not yet been indicted. Increased financial support to the ICTY is imperative to enableexpedited investigations and indictments of those who have so far eluded international censureand to ensure their apprehension. The failure of the Republika Srpska authorities to comply with the orders of the ICTY, combinedwith the refusal of IFOR/SFOR to arrest persons indicted for war crimes even when encounteredin the course of their duty, has permitted war criminals to remain free and retain control. Furthermore, the international communitys willingness to allow money to find its wayinto the hands of suspected war criminals and/or mafia members, leads to questions about theinternational communitys willingness to confront the real problems that threaten thepeace and place the regions stability at risk. The international community has tolerated the continued exercise of power by personsresponsible for the worst atrocities seen in Europe since World War II. This report names thoseindividuals, describes their involvement in serious abuses of international humanitarian andhuman rights law, and highlights their continued obstruction of the Dayton agreement, with theexpectation that the international community will finally take action to hold themaccountableand, in the meantime, will prevent them from lining their pockets at theexpense of their intimidated neighbors, the displaced, the purged and the dead. RECOMMENDATIONS Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the international bodies set up by the Daytonagreement, as well as the OSCE, to take action in the following ways: ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Human Rights Watch, recognizing the critical role that creation of a neutral and professionalpolice force can play in the current situation, urges the International Police Task Force to forwardthat goal in the following ways: ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the United States, Russia and the European Unionto: ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the World Bank, donor governments and agencies, andinternational non-governmental organizations to: ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Human Rights Watch/Helsinki urges the authorities of the entity of Republika Srpskato: ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY The Importance of Conditionality for Reconstruction Aid RECOMMENDATIONS BACKGROUND THE ROLE OF THE PRIJEDOR AUTHORITIES DURING THE WAR AND AFTER THESIGNING OF THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT The Crisis Committeeand Co-Conspirators WHOS WHO IN PRIJEDOR Simo Drljaca: Former Chief of Police and Head of Secret Police Wartime Activities Simo Drljaca and the Prijedor Mafia Ranko Mijic: Acting Chief of Police Zivko Jovic: Acting Deputy Chief of Police Grozdan Mutic: Head of State Security Milomir Stakic: Mayor of Prijedor Momcilo Radanovic, a.k.a. Cigo: Deputy Mayor of Prijedor Srdjo Srdic: President of the Serbian Red Cross Prijedor The Role of the Local Red Cross in EthnicCleansing Milan Mico Kovacevic: Director of Prijedor Hospital Pero Colic: (Former) Commander Fifth Kozara Brigade and the Forty-ThirdBrigade, Prijedor Milenko Vukic: Infrastructure (Electricity) Marko Pavic: Infrastructure (Post Office, Telephone and Telegraph) MEDIA Radio Prijedor Kozarski Vjesnik (Kozara Herald, Newspaper) Television Prijedor THE PRIJEDOR AUTHORITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF THE DAYTON PEACEAGREEMENT Non-Compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement: The Prijedor Police Drljaca Ousted, Turns Up Again Persons Indicted for War Crimes Serve as Police Officers inPrijedor and Omarska Police Weapons Ljubija Special Police Force Obstruction of Freedom of Movement by Prijedor Authorities Elections Disappearances Detention Harassment of Journalists and Monitors Evictions and Harassment of Persons Based Upon Their Ethnic or PoliticalAffiliation Destruction of Property to Prevent Repatriation Linkages and Loyalties THE ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING Tangled in the Web: Reconstruction Aid and the Architects of EthnicCleansing British ODA Response to Information Gathered by Human RightsWatch/Helsinki Aid to the Prijedor Hospital CONCLUSION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS APPENDIX A: Structure of the Crisis Committee of Prijedor Municipality:1992 APPENDIX B: Letter from Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic to U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan Human Rights Watch January 1997 Vol. 9, No. 1 (D) To order the full text of this report click ![]() For more Human Rights Watch reports on Bosnia click HERE. ![]() To return to the list of 1996 publications click ![]() Or, to return to the index of Human Rights Watch reports click HERE. ![]() |